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From Fome Zero to Bolsa Familia: Social 
Policies and Poverty Alleviation 
under Lula* 
ANTHONY HALL 
Abstract. Under the administrations of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (I995-2002) and especially President Lula (2003-), conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes 
have become adopted as mainstream social policy in Brazil. This follows a marked 
trend since the 1990s in Latin America towards the setting up of targeted safety 
nets to alleviate poverty. Lula consolidated and expanded CCTs, firstly under 
Fome Zero and later Bolsa Familia, now the largest such scheme in the world. Its four 
sub-programmes (educational stipends to boost school attendance, maternal 
nutrition, food supplements and a domestic gas subsidy) benefit some 30 million of 
Brazil's poorest people, with a target of 44 million by 2006. Since 2003, spending on 
Bolsa Familia has risen significantly to consume over one-third of the social assist- 
ance budget for the poorest sectors and it remained a flagship olicy in the run-up 
to the presidential elections of October 2006. Although coverage of Bolsa Familia 
is impressive, however, systematic evaluation of its social and economic impacts 
is still lacking. Evidence from other CCT programmes in Latin America suggests 
that positive results may be achieved in terms of meeting some immediate needs of 
the poor. However, there have been many implementation problems. These include 
poor beneficiary targeting, lack of inter-ministerial coordination, inadequate 
monitoring, clientelism, weak accountability and alleged political bias. Given the 
heightened profile of cash transfers inBrazil's social policy agenda, key questions 
need to be asked. These concern, firstly, the extent o which Bolsa Familia does 
indeed contribute to poverty alleviation; and secondly, whether it creates greater 
dependence of the poor on government hand-outs and political patronage at the 
expense of long-term social investment for development. 
Introduction 
When President Luis Inicio Lula da Silva took office in January 2003, Fome 
Zero (Zero Hunger) soon became the defining flagship policy of his 
government. Inspired by the Millennium Development Goals, which call 
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for halving hunger and extreme poverty by zoI 5, the ambitious programme 
was intended to bring regular supplies of food and cash aid to Brazil's 
estimated 44 million living below the official poverty line. Building 
upon policies already established under the administration f President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Fome Zero sought to expand and consolidate 
the social safety net programme.' It also represented a heartfelt personal 
commitment by Brazil's first working class president to address the country's 
seemingly intractable problems of poverty and severe inequality. At his 
inauguration, Lula famously pledged: 'If, by the end of my term of office, 
every Brazilian has food to eat three times a day, I shall have fulfilled my 
mission in life.' 
Brazil's enthusiasm for constructing social safety nets has followed 
a marked international trend in policy-making since the late I98os.2 The 
free market ideology developed under the Reagan and Thatcher adminis- 
trations, amongst others, was transferred to the developing countries 
through programmes of economic stabilisation and structural adjustment 
via the IMF and World Bank. Under a varying package of measures ome- 
times loosely referred to as the 'Washington Consensus',3 moves towards 
market deregulation and increased competition would lead to the dis- 
mantling of state machinery, growing privatisation of service provision and 
cutbacks in public spending, especially in the social sectors. This process 
helped to destroy much of the social protection infrastructure in a region 
where effective and universal welfare systems had been developed in 
only five countries (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba and Uruguay), and 
where the impacts of social policies have generally been regressive with 
negative distributional consequences. Higher income groups have secured 
the lion's share of benefits and subsidies in key sectors uch as education, 
health and pensions provision. On cost grounds, universalisation has 
been dismissed as too expensive in the context of developing countries. In 
particular, it was argued that such generous anti-poverty solutions were 
not affordable under conditions of economic austerity. However, even 
more critically, the notion of universal citizenship rights has (except in 
the case of Cuba) generally been eschewed in favour of selective social 
1 'Safety nets' is a broad label to describe short-term, targeted interventions for vulnerable 
households designed to mitigate the immediate effects of poverty and other risks, providing 
assistance in the form of cash, food, housing, subsidies, fee waivers, scholarships and 
public works programmes. 
2 A. Hall and J. Midgley, Social Poliy for Development, Sage (London, 2004). 
3 J. Williamson, 'What Washington means by policy reform', in J. Williamson (ed.), Latin 
American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? Institute for International Economics 
(Washington DC, 1990). 
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rights linked to the politically determined istribution of benefits by the 
State.4 
The solution for maximising both economic and political returns from 
the distribution fscarce social funding has been to target the poorest and 
most vulnerable groups through the use of specific instruments such as 
social funds implemented by a range of institutions including overnment, 
civil society, international donors and, indeed, poor communities themselves. 
This reaction was in part a pragmatic and understandable response for 
rapidly dealing with the increased suffering of some sectors brought about 
by the adverse social and economic impacts of structural adjustment.5 
However, it also represented a major ideological shift in thinking towards 
a more selective and means-tested approach for addressing mass poverty. 
This approach was formalised and endorsed at the highest international 
levels through the conceptualisation of social safety nets. These nets would 
not only 'catch' the poor and 'protect' them from economic shocks in the 
short term; they would also provide a 'springboard' for development, 
creating employment and income-earning opportunities through strategies of 
'social risk management'.6 In Latin America, social safety nets have been 
enthusiastically embraced by many governments. In particular, conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) programmes are increasingly regarded as a major social 
policy instrument ina number of countries. Since the late 1990s, apart from 
Brazil, major CCT programmes have been introduced in Mexico (Progresa, 
now known as Oportunidades), Colombia (Familias en Accidn), Chile (Subsidio 
Unitario Familiar), Nicaragua (Red de Proteccio'n Social), Argentina (Jefes de Hogar) 
and Ecuador (Bono de Desarrollo Humano).7 
Their underlying principle is that human capital can be enhanced as 
a development vehicle by providing money to families to persuade them to 
invest in themselves through greater participation in education and health 
services. The technical rationale is that, by focusing on children, long-term 
human capital accumulation can help break the inter-generational trans- 
mission of poverty. Through stimulating effective d mand for social services, 
it is also designed to counter the shortcomings of supply-side interventions 
such as schools and clinics that often do not reach the poor. This CCT 
approach, in theory at least, contrasts with traditional social assistance 
4 C. Abel and C. Lewis, 'A Diagnosis of Social Policy in Latin America in the Long Run', in 
C. Abel and C. Lewis (eds), Exclusion and Engagement: Social Policy in Latin America (London, 
2002), pp. 3-71. 
5 See G. Cornia, et al., Adjustment with a Human Face (Oxford, 1987), and T. Conway, Social 
Protection: New Directions for Donor Agencies, DFID (London, 2000). 
6 World Bank, Social Protection Strategy Paper: from Safety Net to Springboard (Washington DC, 
2000). 
7 L. Rawlings, A New Approach to Social Assistance: Latin America's Experience with Conditional 
Cash Transfer Programs, World Bank (Washington DC, 2oo4). 
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strategies that use short-term redistributive mechanisms to tackle poverty 
during times of crisis. It aims to foster joint responsibility between families 
and the government, placing the onus on parents to spend cash wisely and 
ensure attendance at schools and health clinics. Thus, it is seen as con- 
stituting a break from clientelism and, in the words of one World Bank study, 
'has been heralded as an alternative to more traditional, paternalistic 
approaches to social assistance and has helped counter criticisms of CCT 
programmes as handouts'.8 However, as the case of Brazil considered below 
illustrates, this is very much a matter of contention. 
Yet CCT programmes are seen as offering other innovations and 
advantages over traditional social assistance. In addition to encouraging 
human capital formation a d family responsibility, CCTs are reputedly easier 
to target than other social assistance programmes, using geographical and 
household level criteria, including proxy-means tests to estimate household 
poverty levels. Providing cash (rather than benefits in kind, food stamps 
or vouchers) is more cost-effective and flexible, and avoids the creation 
of distorting secondary markets. Furthermore, the focus on health, education 
and nutrition fosters those synergies amongst diverse components of 
human capital considered essential for breaking the vicious circle of inter- 
generational poverty. Several countries adopting CCTs have also carried 
out evaluations that have provided empirical evidence of their effectiveness, 
facilitating scaling-up and political-administrative continuity. 
Social sector and social assistance spending in Brazil 
Government figures show that social sector spending as a whole in Brazil is 
quite high, at 16 per cent of GDP, with funding of direct costs equivalent 
to 14.1 per cent of GDP (Table i). In 2004, social security, including 
pensions, accounted for 60o per cent of direct social spending in Brazil, health 
for 13 per cent and education for just over five per cent. However, Brazil's 
social sector investment, while comparing reasonably well with the OECD 
average of 25 per cent of GDP, is undermined by its high spending on 
pensions. Whereas pensions in OECD countries account on average for 3 3 
per cent of spending, this figure rises to 44 per cent in the case of Brazil, 
surpassed only by Italy and Mexico.9 
'Social assistance', targeted at the poorest groups, remains a relatively 
small proportion of the total social budget. However, it has expanded 
steadily under the administrations of both Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1995-zoo2) and, especially, Lula (2003--). Under Fernando Henrique 
8 Ibid., p. 6. 
9 Brazil, Orfamento Social do Governo Federal 2001-2004, Minist&rio da Fazenda, Secretaria de 
Politica Econ6mica (Brasilia, 2005). 
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Table i. Spending onsocialprogrammes in Brail,.2001oo-2006 
Total social Social assistance Bolsa 
budget* budget** Familia*** 
% direct % direct 
social social assistance 
R$ (billions) % GDP R$ (billions) budget R$ (billions) budget 
2001 16o 13-3 8.5 5.3 1.5 18.o 
2002 182 13.5 10.2 5.6 2.4 23.0 
2003 213 13.7 12.9 6.o 3.4 26.0 
2004 249 14.1 16.2 6.5 5.8 36.0 
200f 17.0 6.5 38.0 
2006 22.0 8.3 38.0 
Sources: Orfamento Social do Governo Federal 200oo-2004, Minist&rio da Fazenda, Secretaria de 
Politica Econ6mica, Brasilia (200oo); 'Queda da pobreza e maior no campo que nas metr6- 
poles', Folha de Sdo Paulo, I January (2006); 'QuitaFio da divida do FMI permitirai investir a 
favor do povo, diz Lula', O Estado de Sdo Paulo, 16 January (2006). * Direct costs of social security and pensions, health, education, social assistance, worker 
protection, housing and sanitation and agrarian organization. 
** Direct costs of assistance to children and nutrition including Bolsa Familia, child labour, 
school feeding, help for the elderly and physically disabled, indigenous groups, etc. *** Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentafdo, Cartdo Alimentafdo and Auxilio Gds. 
Cardoso (FHC), there was a significant increase in social assistance spending, 
reaching 5.6 per cent of total social spending by 2002 as protection pro- 
grammes, such as Bolsa Escola, expanded. By 2004, social assistance was 
budgeted at R$16.2 billion, equivalent to 0.9 per cent of GDP and 6.5 per 
cent of the total social budget. In nominal terms, therefore, total social 
assistance spending leapt by 60 per cent under Lula from 2002-2004. 
However, as a proportion of the total social budget the increase was less 
dramatic, although still significant, moving from 5.6 to 6.5 per cent. 
Increased spending for Bolsa Familia specifically has been more marked. 
As Table I shows, spending on the four major safety net programmes, 
comprising what has become known as Bolsa Familia, grew from 23 per 
cent of the social assistance budget (R$2.4 billion) in 2oo02 under FHC to 36 
per cent (R$5.8 billion) under Lula in 2004. This rose to R$6.5 billion in 
2005 and will reach a predicted R$8.3 billion in 2006, or 38 per cent of 
overall social assistance. Figure i underlines the heavier emphasis on 
safety net spending under Fome Zero and Bolsa Familia within the social 
budget under Lula after 2003. During the Lula administration, spending 
on Bolsa Familia has risen from I.i to 2.5 per cent of total government 
expenditure, increasing from 0.2 to 0. 5 per cent of GDP.10 However, to keep 
10 K. Lindert, 'Bolsa Familia Program - Scaling-Up Cash Transfers for the Poor', MJDR 
Principles in Action: Sourcebook on Emerging Good Practice, World Bank (Washington DC, 200zoo). 
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matters in perspective, it should be borne in mind that Bolsa Familia ccounts 
for just 2.3 per cent of direct monetary transfers inBrazil, far outweighed 
by pensions at 82 per cent, which are far more regressive.11 
Fome Zero 
'Zero Hunger' marked out the Workers' Party (PT) government as socially 
progressive and seemingly more serious about dealing with poverty than any 
other previous regime. The programme itself was inspired by Jose Graziano 
da Silva, former professor of agrarian studies at the University of Campinas 
in SIo Paulo, appointed by Lula to head the newly created Ministry of Food 
Security and Fight Against Hunger. Fome Zero was in practice an umbrella 
programme for initiatives already developed under the FHC administration. 
These federal initiatives had in turn developed from localised projects started 
during the I990s, replacing an earlier programme of distributing food parcels 
(cestas baisicas-PRODEA) which operated from 1993 to 2000 and was 
designed to provide for the needs of a family for one month.12 However, 
n Brazil, Orcamento Social. 
12 Smaller CCT projects had already been implemented at municipal level from 1995 onwards 
in Campinas, Brasilia, Blumenau, Belo Horizonte, Victoria, Salvador and Ribeirdo Preto. 
See J. Graziano da Silva, W. Belik and M. Takagi, 'The Challenges of a Policy of Food 
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food parcels were heavily criticised for being unashamedly used to capture 
votes, with 30 million being distributed inthe general election year of 1998, 
twice the normal number.13 Fome Zero thus brought ogether under one label 
several existing initiatives; namely, the conditional cash transfer (CCT) pro- 
grammes of Bolsa Escola for boosting school attendance, Bolsa Alimentafdo for 
maternal nutrition a d the PETI programme against child labour, along with 
the Auxilio Gds cooking gas subsidy. However, it also added a new food 
entitlement scheme, the Cartao Alimentafdo, based on the use of a special 
credit card for the purchase of selected food items. 
The flagship within this 'flagship' programme, however, was always Bolsa 
Escola (School Grant) that provides mothers with a monthly stipend 
(currently the equivalent of US$7 per month per child) in return for their 
children attending school at least 85 per cent of the time. Started in the 
Federal District of Brasilia in 1995, by then governor Cristovam Buarque, as 
well as in Campinas and Sdo Paulo, it was adopted nationally in 2001. By the 
end of 2003, the scheme had been implemented in almost all of the country's 
5,561 municipalities and had distributed almost US$5 oo million in grants to 
over five million families with 8.6 million children. According to the latest 
available figures, Bolsa Escola accounts for around half the total spending on 
the four major safety net programmes under Bolsa Familia.14 
In consolidating existing safety net programmes, however, the Lula 
administration did introduce some major changes. Firstly, in line with 
President Lula's electoral promises, Fome Zero was underpinned by a clear 
and vociferous political commitment tobenefit he very poorest sectors of 
Brazilian society. Secondly, while implementation of the programme was 
decentralised to municipal level, Graziano's ministry attempted, in some 
measure, to bypass local political interests o create an alternative distribution 
network; for example, by substituting food stamps with credit card style 
food cards which were in theory at least less vulnerable to incorrect use. 
However, as noted below, decentralisation fprogramme implementation 
has brought its own political problems. Third, appeals were made to major 
companies such as Ford and Unilever, as well as to supermarket chains, for 
contributions towards Fome Zero that would signify a new sense of corporate 
social responsibility and alliance between public and private sectors. Over 
00oo companies are now involved in the scheme. 
International donors such as the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter- 
American Development Bank moved quickly to endorse the Lula govern- 
ment's anti-poverty stance. After all, it testified to the new administration's 
Security in Brazil', in A. Cimadamore, H. Dean and J. Siqueira (eds), The Poverty ofthe State: 
reconsidering the role of the state in the struggle against global poverty (Buenos Aires, 200oo), 
pp. 157-78. 13 Ibid. 
14 Brazil, Orfamento Social. 
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prudent social policies, belying its radical left-wing image. It also fitted in 
very nicely with the increasingly popular view held by international financial 
institutions, led by the World Bank, of social policy as the construction of 
safety nets.15 During the 1980s and 90s, the introduction ofsocial funds to 
deal with the adverse impacts of structural adjustment had become well 
established.16 Subsequently, the collapse of the Soviet Union and compre- 
hensive social security schemes in the former communist countries, together 
with the East Asia crisis, led to the introduction flarge-scale, targeted social 
protection measures with World Bank assistance. As noted above, these 
emergency measures were now couched in the language of 'social risk 
management', intended to go beyond the provision of short-term relief to 
help strengthen people's livelihoods and their ability to cope with shocks and 
risks in the long-term. At the same time, the Bank set up a special Social 
Protection Unit within its Human Development network to oversee this 
policy. In 2005,zoo social protection accounted for some 12 per cent of total 
Bank lending, with US$2.5 billion invested in 45 projects.17 
Yet despite the initial enthusiasm which accompanied the inauguration of 
Fome Zero in early 2003, serious problems soon became apparent. Many were 
due to the fact that each programme operated independently of the other 
with no overall coordination. Each had separate administrative structures, 
beneficiary selection processes and banking contracts for payments. The 
Lula government inherited a partially unified atabase, or Cadastro Unico, 
from the previous administration but this covered only 70 per cent of poor 
families. This made effective implementation more difficult, eading to high 
implementation costs and targeting errors.18 Problems included the adoption 
of political criteria for selecting beneficiary families, an over-centralised 
management system, exclusion of some eligible poor families, duplication of 
benefits and a lack of updated information. Even the then Minister Graziano 
publicly admitted to a targeting error under the programme of up to 30 per 
cent, which led to long delays in implementation.19 
Bolsa Familia 
By mid-zoo3, just a few months into the Lula administration, such problems 
were already creating disillusionment with Fome Zero, which was perceived as 
increasingly ineffective in fulfilling its mission to fight hunger and absolute 
15 Hall and Midgley, Social Poliy for Development, Sage (London, 2004). 
16 K. Subbarao, Safet yNet Programs and Poverty 
Reduction: Lessons from Cross Count~y Experience, 
World Bank (Washington DC, 1997). 
17 World Bank, Putting Social Development to Work for the Poor: An OED Review of World Bank 
Activities (Washington DC, 200oo5). 18 IPEA, Politicas Sociais: Acompanhamento e Anilise, no. 7, August (2003). 19 'UnificapAo na area social fica para 2004', Folha de Sdo Paulo, Io June (2003oo). 
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poverty. The newly labelled Bolsa Familia (Family Grant) scheme was thus 
announced in October 2003 to integrate the actions and budgets of the four 
main CCT programmes; namely Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentafdo, Cartdo 
Alimentafdo and Auxilio Gds. Bolsa Familia is now the largest conditional cash 
transfer programme in the world. The distinctive Fome Zero label was retained 
as a wider umbrella term to encapsulate the overall safety net programme in 
Brazil involving a diverse range of over 30 social interventions i  the areas of 
food security, farming and other forms of support, including Bolsa Tamilia, 
although the label is regarded as cosmetic.20 
The unification of safety net programmes under Bolsa Familia involved 
significant changes. Under the old set-up, the components of Fome Zero were 
administered separately: Bolsa Escola (Ministry of Education), Bolsa 
Alimentafdo (Ministry of Health), Cartdo Alimentafdo (F me Zero) and Auxilo 
Gas (Ministry of Mines and Energy). Although providing benefits to roughly 
the same target population, they were difficult to administer, each scheme 
having its own bureaucratic structure, data collection, fiduciary responsi- 
bilities and reporting systems. Not only was this fragmentation costly, but it 
sacrificed potential benefits in terms of synergies and complementarities at 
the family level in schooling, health and nutrition. By contrast, integration 
has helped reduce administrative costs, improve targeting efficiency, 
standardise procedures and results indicators and coordinate federal with 
state level safety net programmes. Conditionalities for education, health and 
nutrition were merged to produce greater synergy while unit transfer benefits 
were also increased. There is a new emphasis on targeting the household unit 
rather than the individual. 
However, many aspects of Bolsa Familia implementation remain decen- 
tralised to municipal level. These include data collection, registration of 
potential beneficiaries under a single register (Cadastro Unico) and monitoring 
of adherence to conditionalities. Under Brazil's decentralisation law, each 
municipality is required to set up a social council (Conselho de Controle Social) 
for this purpose, whose members are chosen by the mayor from public and 
civil society sectors. 
In January 2004, President Lula announced the integration of the Ministry 
of Food Security and Fight against Hunger with the Ministry of Social 
Welfare to form the new Ministry of Social Development and Fight against 
Hunger (MDS). Graziano was replaced by Patrus Ananias as Minister of 
Social Development. The Inter-ministerial Management Committee and 
Executive Secretariat for Bolsa Familia, originally linked directly to the 
President's Office, were transferred to the new MDS in order to facilitate 
better integration of social programmes. 
20 
http://www.fomezero.gov.br/ 
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The scheme is targeted at two groups, the 'very poor' with household 
incomes of up to R$5o (US$23 per month), and the 'poor' with household 
incomes of R$5 1-IOO (US$23.50-46) per month. The upper limit was 
increased in April zoo6 to R$2zo (US$5 5) in order to facilitate attainment of
the overall target numbers. Very poor families are awarded a fixed monthly 
stipend of R$5o regardless of family size, while families earning between 
R$5 1-120 per month receive no basic payment. Both groups are eligible for 
variable payments of R$I1 (US$7) per child of school age (6-15) to a maximum of three, or up to six years of age under Bolsa Alimentafdo. The 
maximum benefit per household was set at R$95 (US$43). These cash grants 
are conditional upon proof of regular presence at school, children's 
vaccination, attendance at health clinics and, where relevant, participation in 
nutrition and vocational training courses. The gas subsidy provides R$I5 
every two months for the same social groups to purchase cooking gas 
cylinders. The Cartao Alimentafdo, or food card system, was initiated in March 
2003 for the poor, semi-arid Northeast as part of Fome Zero. It gives families 
earning up to half the minimum wage a monthly cash supplement of R$50 for food purchases. 
In June 2004, the World Bank approved a US$57z million sector-wide 
loan (SWAP) to support Bolsa Familia. This will provide funds for cash 
transfers (96 per cent) as well as for technical assistance to develop a unified 
database, improve targeting mechanisms, develop a system for monitoring 
and evaluation, strengthen the institutions involved and the programme's 
implementation capacity within the MDS and to develop a dissemination a d 
communications strategy.21 In December of the same year, the Inter- 
American Development Bank (1DB) approved a loan of US$I billion for 
Bolsa Familia, with the promise of up to US$z billion, depending on satis- 
factory progress.22 These two multilateral commitments, totalling US$2.57 
billion, are the equivalent of one-quarter of the estimated total funding 
for Bolsa Familia (R$24 billion) during the Lula government and provide 
an unequivocal external endorsement of the safety net/CCT approach to 
poverty reduction in Brazil. The Bank has also been very generous in its 
public praise for Bolsa Familia, whose instruments are seen as having an 
applicability beyond Brazil itself to other countries implementing CCT 
schemes.23 
21 World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Adaptable Program Loan to the Federative 
Republic of Brazil in Support of the First Phase of the Bolsa Familia Program (Washington DC, May 
25, 2004). 
22 cIDB approves loan of US$i billion for expansion and consolidation of social protection in 
Brazil based on the Bolsa Familia program', Press Release, 15 December (2004). 23 K. Lindert, 'Bolsa Familia Program'. 'Banco Mundial faz elogio ao Bolsa-Familia', Folha de 
Sdo Paulo, 15 February (2006). 
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Assessment of progress 
The first generation of CCT programmes in Latin America (Mexico, 
Colombia, Honduras and Nicaragua) incorporated evaluation strategies 
using a variety of techniques, allowing preliminary conclusions to be drawn 
regarding their effectiveness.24 Education programmes in Mexico, Colombia 
and Nicaragua have boosted primary school enrolment rates for both boys 
and girls. However, results on regular attendance are mixed while the issue 
of quality of schooling provided is not usually addressed. Child health and 
nutrition has also improved in these countries as a result of CCTs, with 
greater participation in growth monitoring and immunisation campaigns. At 
the same time, food security has improved, with cash transfers leading to 
higher levels of consumption and nutrition. Evaluation results how that 
over 80 per cent of CCT programme benefits in these countries reach the 
poorest 40 per cent of families.25 
While this first round of evaluation results is, in general terms, encourag- 
ing, evidence on the performance of Bolsa Familia has yet to be systematically 
gathered. In terms of numerical achievements, he record of Bolsa Familia has 
been impressive in many respects. First, the number of beneficiaries has 
more than doubled in three years to over 30 million. This is the equivalent 
of roughly three-quarters of those living below the poverty line, who are 
concentrated mainly in the poorest North and Northeast regions. Second, 
according to official estimates, the average level of benefit paid per family has 
almost tripled from R$28 (US$I 3) to R$75 (US$34) per month.26 By the end 
of 2005, some 8.7 million families had been included and this figure was 
expected to rise by late zoo6 to 1.2 million families or 44 million people, its 
eventual target population.27 
At the moment, based on evidence from other Latin American countries, 
sweeping assumptions are being made that safety net programmes such as 
these can reduce inequalities, strengthen human capital and improve people's 
well-being. Brazil's Ministry of Finance, for example, has confidently 
declared that, 'programmes such as Bolsa Familia re highly efficient instru- 
ments in the fight against poverty.'28 Official government statements othe 
press regularly make similar claims. The reported reduction in rural poverty 
levels in Brazil from 39.5 per cent in 2003 to 3 5.4 per cent in 2004 has been 
attributed in large measure to cash transfers such as pensions and Bolsa 
24 Rawlings, A New Approach toSocialAssistance. 25 Ibid. 
26 Brazil, Orfamento Social, p. 24. 
27 Ibid. World Bank, Brazil: Equitable, Competitive, Sustainable: Contributions for Debate 
(Washington DC, 2004). 
28 Brazil, Orfamento S cial, p. 16. 'Bolsa-Familia alivia pobreza, diz governo', Folha de Sdo Paulo, 
25 December (2005). 
700 Anthony Hall 
Familia.29 However, critics express doubts about the ability of Bolsa Familia to 
help generate income or employment. Questions have also been raised over 
a number of key operational dimensions concerning, for example, targeting 
and selection procedures, the effectiveness of conditionalities, the role of 
politics and clientelism, weak local institutional capacity, the participation of 
civil society and the degree of transparency and accountability. 
Although there has not yet been any comprehensive impact evaluation of 
Bolsa Familia, some investigations have been carried out. A longitudinal 
study by the Ministry of Health and the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) in four northeastern municipalities, over an 18 month 
period from 2002-2003, concluded that the Food Grant (Bolsa Alimentadio) 
component, which makes monthly cash grants to women of R$25 (US$I i) conditional upon regular health clinic attendance, had succeeded in boosting 
the food security of mothers and children. The quantity and diversity of food 
consumed improved, while the growth and nutritional status of children had 
progressed compared with non-participants in the programme."3 A com- 
prehensive impact evaluation of Bolsa Familia is underway during 200 5-06, 
funded by the World Bank loan mentioned above, that will no doubt shed 
light on the consequences for school attendance, nutrition status and other 
social indicators.31 An ex-ante valuation of Bolsa Escola using simulation 
techniques concluded that it would increase school enrolments amongst 
poor ten- to I 5-year olds by 60o per cent but would reduce poverty by just one 
per cent.32 An early evaluation of the PETI child labour scheme in selected 
Northeastern states showed that it reduced the probability that children 
would work by up to 26 per cent.33 
Although comprehensive impact evaluations of Bolsa Familia as a whole 
are presently lacking, some studies have been carried out of Bolsa Escola, its 
largest component, which was introduced in various municipalities during 
the 1990s before being extended as a national programme in 2001. One such 
investigation into early municipal school stipend programmes, based on 2000 
Census data, found that they had a positive impact on school attendance but 
29 'Queda da pobreza e maior no campo que nas metr6poles', Folha de Sdo Paulo, I January 
(zoo6). 
30 Ministry of Health, Avaliafdo Final de Impacto do Programa Bolsa-Alimentafdo (Brasilia, 2004). 
A similar study is being carried out by the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA) in three 
northeastern municipalities of Bolsa Familia impacts upon the local economy, health and 
nutrition status. 
31 This is being undertaken by Centre for Development and Regional Planning 
(CEDEPLAR) at the Federal University of Minas Gerais. 
32 F. Bourgignon, F. Ferreira and P. Leite, 'Conditional Cash Transfers, Schooling and Child 
Labor: Micro-Simulating Brazil's Bolsa Escola Program', The World Bank Economic Review, 
vol. 17, no. z, pp. 229-54. 
33 Cited by Rawlings, 'A New Approach to SocialAssistance', pp. 9-10. 
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had no significant effect on child labour since children were induced to go to 
school and work concomitantly. That is, the cash transfers provided were 
too small an incentive to persuade families to forgo child labour.34 More 
worryingly, research based on Brazil's national household survey (PNAD) 
for 2003 concluded that Bolsa Escola, which is aimed at children aged from six 
to 15 years of age, is poorly targeted and does not benefit hose families 
whose children are more likely to be persuaded to attend school by a cash 
stipend.35 The study found that, for children aged between seven and 13, the 
cash incentive ffect is negligible since they are likely to attend anyway as 
provision is universal. Yet it is in this age group where most Bolsa Escola 
benefits are concentrated. However, children start dropping out of school at 
age 14 and it is in the 14 to 17 age range where a cash incentive would be 
most effective inretaining children, the study concludes. The same research 
into Bolsa Escola found that the programme is generally well focused on 
poorer social groups, with 50 per cent of benefits reaching the two lowest 
income deciles. Yet 18 per cent of cash transfers accrue to 1.5 million chil- 
dren in the fifth income decile and higher, suggesting the presence of some 
distributive distortions.36 
Further evidence on the effectiveness of Bolsa Escola is provided by 
a process evaluation of its implementation, based on field surveys carried out 
in 2004 in 261 randomly selected municipalities in four states of Northeast 
Brazil.37 Although programme impacts on targeting, educational partici- 
pation and poverty alleviation will be assessed only at a later date, the study 
nevertheless provides important initial insights into the highly variable mu- 
nicipal record of implementation and some of the problems encountered. 
The evaluation found, for example, that beneficiary screening and selection 
for Bolsa Escola is based on a range of objective and diverse criteria set at local 
and federal levels (such as per capita family income, schooling, family size, 
ages of children, health records, etc.) and that the process is on the whole 
quite transparent, with widespread discussion and dissemination of infor- 
mation. Initial confusion over the respective roles of municipal and central 
government in beneficiary selection was clarified under Bolsa Familia by a 
ruling which transferred responsibility for this task over to the federal 
authorities. 
34 E. Cardoso and A. Portlea Souza, 'The Impact of Cash Transfers on Child Labor and 
School Attendance in Brazil', mimeo, 2003. 
35 S. Schwartzman, 'Education-oriented social programs in Brazil: the impact of Bolsa 
Escola', mimeo, Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e Sociedade, Sdo Paulo, 2005. 
36 Ibid., p. I6. 
37 A. de Janvry, et al., 'Brazil's Bolsa Escola Program: The Role of Local Governance in 
Decentralized Implementation', SP Discussion Paper No. 0542, Social Protection Unit, 
World Bank (Washington DC, 2005). 
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Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that targeting errors occur regu- 
larly and that there is, for example, much benefit duplication due to poor 
coordination amongst programmes and an incomplete central database. 
Researchers maintain that it is possible to improve targeting through the 
development of better income-based and proxy means testing devices.38 
Other specialists are more sceptical of this approach as expensive, unwieldy 
and ultimately ineffective.39 A current concern is how to improve the central 
database (Cadastro Unico), the main beneficiary registration and selection 
mechanism for Bolsa Familia, so that it may be used to channel, more effec- 
tively, resources to the poor, in view of persistent problems such as the 
underreporting of incomes and political bias in client selection.40 
A major conclusion of the same study of Bolsa Escola is that transparency 
in beneficiary selection does not necessarily lead to overall accountability. 
Unsurprisingly in the Brazilian context perhaps, strong evidence was found 
of political manipulation in programme implementation in at least ten per 
cent of municipalities ampled. This observation is consistent with alleged 
cases of resource misuse and corruption under Bolsa Familia documented 
regularly in the Brazilian press. Involvement of the mayor's office in ben- 
eficiary registration and selection was associated with the highest levels of 
clientelism and patronage. The absence of 'social councils' comprising local 
citizens and authority representatives, whose function is to monitor pro- 
gramme execution and induce a degree of transparency and accountability, 
was found to increase the likelihood of such favouritism. Where they had 
been set up, and where they were actually working (in two-thirds of cases), 
councils were found to be quite effective on the whole and their impact on 
programme implementation was generally positive. Yet one-fifth of munici- 
palities sampled had no such council, despite the fact that it is a federal 
requirement. It was also found that they often performed poorly, their ob- 
jectivity in monitoring beneficiary selection and adherence to conditionalities 
(such as school attendance) being compromised by local connections and 
affiliation to the mayor, to whom council members were not infrequently 
38 R. Paes de Barros and M. Carvalho, 'Desafios para a Politica Social Brasileira', Textos Para 
Discussio, No. 98 5, IPEA (Rio de Janeiro, 2003). M. Neri, 'Designing a System of Social 
Targets and Social Credit', and M. Medeiros, 'Conditional Flow Transfers in Brazil: Some 
Problems for Targeting the Poor'. Papers presented at the conference on Overcoming Social 
Exclusion: 
Brazil 
in Comparative Perspective, Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of 
Oxford, 22 June (2004). 
39 E. Suplicy, 'The Approval of the Citizen's Basic Income Bill in Brazil', and G. Standing, 
'Promoting Income Security as a Right'. Papers presented at the conference on Overcoming 
Social Exclusion: Brazil in Comparative Perspective, Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of 
Oxford, 2z June (2004). 
40 B. de la Briere and K. Lindert, Reforming Brazil's Cadastro Unico to Improve Targeting of the Bolsa 
Familia Program (Washington DC, zoo5). 
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related. One official report by the federal auditors (Tribunal de Contas 
da Unido) strongly criticised Bolsa Tamilia for its lack of programme moni- 
toring.41 
A major bone of contention i  discussions over the effectiveness of CCTs 
lies in the supposedly 'conditional' nature of cash transfers. As noted earlier, 
the theory is that benefits should be contingent upon mothers and children 
meeting social obligations such as regular school attendance, undergoing 
health screening and receiving vaccinations. Not only anecdotal evidence, 
but also systematic research, demonstrates that in practice the monitoring 
and enforcement ofsuch conditionalities s highly problematic. For example, 
school teachers are often reluctant o report absent pupils, while social 
councils eem unable or unwilling to perform a policing role. In the words of 
one study: 
The federal government is unable to supervise the behaviour of poor families 
throughout the country; local governments and municipalities are either inefficient 
or tied up with local elites, or both; and community grassroots organisations are 
easily captured by political parties and movements.42 
Imposing conditionalities s often seen not only as difficult inpractice but 
also as paternalistic in principle, leading many to recommend its replacement 
by unconditional support.43 Only time will tell whether such obligations are 
justified in terms of inducing improvements in economic and social in- 
dicators and in building human capital. 
Beyond questions of operational effectiveness, however, lie more funda- 
mental concerns. Serious doubts have been raised, for example, about the 
ability of such safety nets, even when properly implemented, to mount 
a serious challenge to poverty in the context of highly unequal societies 
such as Brazil. Some critics allege that Bolsa Familia is an essentially 
politically-driven strategy for holding down increases in the legal minimum 
wage which, they maintain, would actually benefit more families working 
in both formal and informal sectors, through multiplier effects. In contrast, 
based on IPEA research findings, the government insists that selective 
income transfers have had a more significant anti-poverty impact than wage 
policy.44 Echoing the more universalistic wage policy approach, Senator 
Eduardo Suplicy (Sio Paulo, PT) has for over a decade been fighting 
41 'Para o TCU, falta de fiscalizavdo prejudica Bolsa-Familia', 0 Estado de Sao Paulo, 30 
September (2004). 
42 S. Schwartzman, 'Education-oriented social programs in Brazil', p. 25. 
43 Ibid. and Suplicy, 'The Approval...' 
44 'Bolsa-Familia supera o minimo, diz estudo', Folha de Sdo Paulo, 22 June (2004). 'Minimo 
deve ser avaliado junto com politicas ociais, diz Palocci', O Estado de Sdo Paulo, 8 June 
(2004). 
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for the introduction fan unconditional Citizen's Basic Income in Brazil.45 
This was finally approved in January 2004 by the Brazilian Congress (Law 
No. Io,83 5), committing the government to introducing a standard basic 
income in zoo200 for all Brazilians, commencing with the poorest sectors but 
eventually extending it to all citizens. Although Suplicy regards Bolsa Familia 
as the first step towards uch a Citizen's Basic Income, there are clearly major 
practical and ideological differences between the safety net approach and the 
idea of a Citizen's Basic Income as a right.46 
Yet other more far-reaching criticisms of the Bolsa Familia approach to 
social policy concern Brazil's persistent inequality and relative deprivation, 
despite improvements in levels of absolute poverty. With the seventh 
most unequal income distribution i  the world, the top 20 per cent in Brazil 
earn almost 64 per cent of personal income and the bottom quintile just 
2.3 per cent.47 Although the challenges of dealing with absolute poverty and 
inequality are distinct and imply separate kinds of economic and social 
policies, frustration is sometimes expressed over the seeming inability of 
Bolsa Familia to bring about any redistribution fwealth. However, even 
strong advocates of targeted income transfers, such as the World Bank, 
admit that they cannot on their own overcome the poverty generated and 
sustained by entrenched inequities. Ironically, Lula himself acknowledged 
this publicly, declaring that, 'Bolsa Familia is not our salvation, merely an 
emergency measure ... and the ideal is that in a few years time Bolsa Familia 
will no longer be necessary.'48 
Yet the blatant politicisation of Bolsa aramilia suggests that it may retain a
long-term role in Brazil's social policy agenda. It is evident hat Lula and his 
government came to depend heavily on the programme to strengthen pol- 
itical support and generate votes in the October zoo6 presidential elections. 
45 Suplicy, 'The Approval ...'. IPEA, Politicas Sociais:Acompanhamento eA alise, no. 8, February 
(2004). 
46 In a similar vein, human rights activists have for some time advocated the idea of 
a universal child benefit in cash or kind, designed to guarantee longer-term inimum 
living standards and have a more sustainable anti-poverty impact. This would be funded 
through international taxation such as a 'Tobin-style' currency transaction tax to build 
up an international investment fund for children. The ILO, for example, has a plan for 
the elimination of child labour over 20 years at a cost of US$95 million, equivalent to 
less than ten per cent of developing country debt service payments or one-fifth of their 
defence spending. See, P. Townsend, 'Making Human Rights Stick: Action to Eradicate 
Poverty', LSE Seminars on Human R'ghts, London School 
of Economics, 29 June (2004) 
and 'The Need for Direct Policies to Fight Child Poverty', In Focus, UNDP, February 
(2004). 
47 R. Paes de Barros and M. Carvalho, 'Desafios para a Politica Social Brasileira', Textos Para 
Discussdo, No. 98 5, IPEA (Rio de Janeiro, 2003). 
48 'Integra do discurso de Lula em cerim6nia do Bolsa Famila', 0 Estado de Sdo Paulo, 23 December (2005). 
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Reliance on such electoral populism and the strengthening of the President's 
official image as the 'Father of the Poor' (Pai dos Pobres) could indeed help 
compensate at the ballot box for a fundamental political weakness in the Lula 
administration attributable towhat some critics have identified as 'the ab- 
sence of a political project structured within the social movements and mass 
organisations which had sustained the PT since its foundations'.49 Opinion 
polls have demonstrated quite clearly that during zoo6, in the wake of 
corruption scandals, political support for Lula strengthened significantly in 
the Northeast, Brazil's poorest region, in which three-quarters of Bolsa 
Familia beneficiaries are concentrated. Support for Lula has been substan- 
tially higher amongst beneficiaries than amongst those not taking part in the 
programme.50 
The temptations are obvious. With average total monthly transfers under 
Bolsa Familia of almost R$5oo00 (US$230) million per month, official figures 
show that some municipalities rely on the programme for 40 per cent or 
more of their overall budgets. This dependence is especially marked in 
poorer Northeastern municipalities.51 It was also claimed in zoo200 that Bolsa 
Familia could be worth up to 22 million votes for Lula in the 2006 elections.52 
An estimated three-quarters of Brazil's absolute poor (eight million house- 
holds, or 16 per cent of the total) now benefit in some measure from cash 
transfers ofone kind or another. In the Northeast, one-third of households 
receive such transfers, rising to 44 per cent in rural areas.53 Itis therefore not 
difficult to see how this could translate into political support for the 
President. Given his humble origins and unrelenting public commitment 
to poverty alleviation since his inauguration, he is very much personally 
identified with Bolsa Familia. In pre-election speeches, as well as in general 
government publicity campaigns, a concerted government effort was 
mounted, perhaps understandably, to publicise the achievements of Bolsa 
Familia nd gain maximum political advantage.54 
49 P. Flynn, 'Brazil and Lula, zoo200: crisis, corruption and change in political perspective', 
Third World Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 8 (200zoo), p. 1245. 
so 'Bolsa Familia eprincipal razio para subida de Lula', Folba de Sdo Paulo, 26 February (2006). 
Datafolha research showed that while Lula enjoyed an eight point lead over his political 
rivals generally in the Northeast, his figure rose to 21 points in the case of Bolsa Familia 
beneficiaries. See also D. Fleischer, Bra#il Focus, special report, z22 February (200oo6). 
51 R. M. Marques, 'A importnncia do Bolsa Familia nos municipios brasileiros', Cadernos de 
Estudos Desenvolvimento Social em Debate, No. i, Ministry of Social Development (Brasilia, 
2005). 
52 'Bolsa Familia deve ser "arma" de Lula em zoo6', Terra, 9 October (2005). 
53 National household survey (PNAD) data for z004. 
54 In a speech Lula emphasized the fact that, '77 per cent of those living below the poverty 
line are receiving benefits from Bolsa Familia'. See 'Lula faz balanpo de programas sociais 
em Porto Alegre', Folha de Sao Paulo, 17 February (2006). SECOM, the department 
responsible for campaign publicity, made no secret of the fact that Bolsa Familia would be 
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Furthermore, local politicians, especially in the Northeast, have developed 
their own vote-catching strategies in support of the President, capitalising 
on federal schemes uch as Bolsa Familia to strengthen the image of President 
Lula and the Workers Party.55 Indeed, even the political opposition openly 
considered how, in the event of winning power in October zoo6, it would 
extend and modify such CCT programmes to build political support 
amongst the poor.56 Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira presidential 
candidate, Geraldo Alckmin, publicly declared while campaigning in the 
Northeast that, if elected, he would not only maintain Bolsa Familia but 
expand the programme.57 
Conclusion 
The upward trend in budget support for Bolsa Eamilia since 2003 continued 
in 2006, thanks in part to generous assistance from the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank. This testifies to its continuing political 
importance domestically and ideologically as a mark of the re-casting of 
social policy by multilateral organisations. As the President himself noted in a 
televised speech to the nation, Brazil's repayment in December 2005 of its 
US$ 5.5 billion IMF debt, saving at least US$9oo million in interest, would 
also release funds for social programmes.58 Despite such high-profile com- 
mitments, however, there is still a long way to go in delivering comprehen- 
sive social protection to the country's poor. Brazil's first national study of 
food security revealed recently that of the 18 million 'food insecure' popu- 
lation only 5.3 million (29 per cent) was benefited by income transfer pro- 
grammes.59 Yet no matter how effective Bolsa Familia might or might not 
eventually prove to be in terms of alleviating absolute poverty, the govern- 
ment's dependence on such safety nets as a core element of its social policy 
begs much larger questions. 
a high profile area in the elections. See 'Governo acelera gastos em publicidade in- 
stitucional,', Folha de Sdo Paulo, 19 February (2006). ss For example, the major of Te6filo Ottoni declared that she had sent letters to all ben- 
eficiaries of Bolsa Familia nd the 'Electricity for All' (Lu.zpara Todos) programmes in her 
municipality reminding people that these were the personal initiatives of President Lula. 
This had resulted, she declared to the press, in increased political support for the President 
amongst the poor. See 'Prefeita relata pratica de angariar votos para Lula com programa 
federal', Folha de Sao Paulo, 13 February (2006). 
56 'Tucanos preparam plano para seduzir mais pobres', 0 Estado de Sdo Paulo, 19 February 
(2006); 'PT e PSDB convergem no diagn6stico sobre o futuro do Bolsa Familia', Valor 
Econdmico, 31 January (2006). 
57 'No NE, Alckmin diz que Bolsa Familia ndo e criap-o de Lula', 0 Estado de Sco Paulo, 22 
April, (2oo6). 
58 'Quitarao da divida do FMI permitirai investir a favor do povo, diz Lula', O Estado de Sdo 
Paulo, i6 January (2006). 59 IBGE, Seguranfa Alimentar 2004 (Brasilia, 2oo6). 
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A major perverse trend is that the poor in Brazil must now rely increas- 
ingly on government handouts to support their livelihoods. Analysis of 
census data shows that whereas in 1995 earnings from employment con- 
tributed 89 per cent of poor household incomes, by 2004 this proportion had 
dropped to 48 per cent.60 In other words, over half of the income in very 
poor households in Brazil is now derived from federal cash transfers through 
largely non-contributory programmes including Bolsa Familia and rural pen- 
sions. Some observers have identified a growing culture of dependence 
perpetuated through such safety net mechanisms. Less kind critics have re- 
named Bolsa Familia/Bolsa Escola as 'Bolsa Esmola' ('charity grant' or 'beggar's 
grant'). There is a strong risk that the perpetuation of such a hand-out 
culture through safety net policies could lead to increased clientelism as 
politicians consciously use and manipulate these programmes as part of 
wider political and vote-capturing strategies. This would belie the 'social risk 
management' component of current safety net strategies designed to address 
longer-term development challenges. Of course, such dependence of poorer 
classes on federal transfers has to be seen together with the massive reliance 
of the middle classes and former public sector employees upon heavily 
subsidised state pensions, which consumes the lion's share of Brazil's social 
budget. 
A consequence of these political distortions in public expenditure could 
be, however, that key areas of social infrastructure such as schools and 
hospitals are starved of resources. Arguably, it is in these social welfare 
sectors where more long-term investment is necessary to build up the 
human capital necessary as the basis for economic growth. Perhaps it is no 
coincidence that, while spending per annum on education and health in 
Brazil remained constant as a proportion of GDP (0.7 and 0.2 per cent 
respectively) between 2001 and 2004, the social assistance budget grew 
from 0.7 to 0.9 per cent of GDP over the same period.61 Furthermore, 
Bolsa Familia's share of this growing social assistance budget itself increased 
significantly from 26 per cent in 200zoo to 38 per cent in 2oo00 (Table I and 
Figure i). Indeed, it is becoming larger than all other federal govern- 
ment education programmes, excluding higher education.62 In a growing 
number of Latin American countries, CCTs are becoming a cornerstone 
of social policy and there is a danger that although they do certainly represent 
a creative approach to providing social assistance, 'they constitute an 
'end-run' around the more difficult ask of reforming inefficient public 
60 'Pobres se distanciam de ricos e dependem mdos do governo', Folha de Sdo Paulo, 25 
December (2005). 61 Brazil, Orfamento social. 62 S. Schwartzman, 'Education-oriented social programs in Brazil', p. 3. In 2004, non-higher 
federally funded education accounted for R$4 billion, compared with a Bolsa Familia budget 
of R$ 5.8 billion, around half of which is allocated to Bolsa Escola. 
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services.'63 There is a risk that the prioritisation of such schemes may ser- 
iously compromise longer-term investments into basic social infrastructure. 
Finally, it is frequently argued that, in order to mount a serious challenge 
to mass poverty in Brazil, there will have to be modifications in asset own- 
ership, labour markets and economic policy. Indeed, the World Bank itself 
now argues vehemently for strong interventionist policies to address mass 
poverty and inequality while promoting growth.64 In future, Brazil's federal 
CCT schemes may be more closely tied to income-generating opportunities, 
as in the World Bank's 'social risk analysis' model of social protection. This 
approach is already being tried in state-level income transfer programmes 
in Brazil and has been a feature of similar schemes in Chile, Mexico and 
Nicaragua.65 At the national level in Brazil, however, strategies such as 
agrarian reform, together with concomitant cross-sector policy support, are 
essential to help rebuild and sustain rural livelihoods. In addition, poverty 
alleviation must be driven by the creation of stable and decently remunerated 
employment opportunities in both rural and urban areas. Thus, major pov- 
erty reduction in Brazil, it is argued, can only be achieved through vigorous, 
job-creating economic growth together with redistributive policies and social 
investment. 
Building progressive social policy capable of attacking the roots of poverty 
and promoting redistributive welfare remains a major challenge to policy- 
makers. The New Social Policy model of Latin America, with its growing 
reliance on targeting and safety nets, is seen by some as an appropriate 
vehicle for reconciling growth with equity, offering an alternative to more 
regressive, traditional, institutionalised welfare service delivery mechan- 
isms.66 Despite some promising initial evidence from conditional cash 
transfer schemes in the region, however, it remains to be seen how well the 
63 Rawlings, A New Approach toSocialAssistance, p. i i. 
64 D. de Ferranti, et al., Inequality in Latin America. Breaking with History? World Bank 
(Washington DC, 2004). World Bank, World Development Report 2006. Equity and Development 
(Washington DC, 2005). 
65 Nine Brazilian states have their own CCT programmes (Alagoas, Ceara, the federal district 
of Brasilia, Goias, Mattos Grosso do Sul, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Sio Paulo and 
Tocantins). For example, the 'Citizen's Income' (Renda Cidadda scheme in Goias was 
developed from 2000 to substitute he food parcel programme. It permits registered poor 
families to receive cash compensation for the purchase of basic foodstuffs. In Rio de 
Janeiro, the 'Citizen's Cheque' (Cheque Cidadao) initiative was set up in 1999 and distributes 
shopping vouchers to approved needy families. Several of these CCT projects include 
vocational training components. See 'Apenas nove estados tem programas pr6prios de 
transferencia de renda', Valor Econdmico, 31 January (2006) and J. Graziano da Silva et al., 
'The Challenges of a Policy of Food Security in Brazil'. For other Latin American ex- 
periences, see Rawlings, A New Approach to SocialAssistance. 66 Abel and Lewis, 'A Diagnosis of Social Policy'. 
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construction of safety nets such as Bolsa Eamilia can live up to these am- 
bitious expectations in Brazil's case. Perhaps the crux of the matter is not so 
much the viability of the concept itself, but how well it can be applied to 
provide underprivileged sectors of society with lasting access to basic ser- 
vices and job opportunities which may enhance their life chances. 
